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THE ROLE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHERS IN THE 
COMPETITION BETWEEN DEONTOLOGICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL DESERT 
Desert has become increasingly attractive as  a principle by 
which to distribute criminal liability and punishment. A number 
of modern sentencing guidelines have adopted it a s  their distribu- 
tive principle.' Most recently, a committee of the American Law 
Institute proposed revising the Model Penal Code "purposes" section 
to adopt desert as the dominant distributive p r in~ ip le .~  
* Colin S. Diver Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The 
author wishes to acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Desiree Liverseidge and 
the useful comments of Leo Katz, Stephen Morse, and participants of the Conference on Law 
and Morality, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, William & Mary School of Law, especially 
Claire Finkelstein and Michael Moore. 
1. See, e.g., David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other 
Washington, 28 CRIME & JUST. 71, 71-72 (2001) ("[Washington State's] Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1981 rejected many core tenets of indeterminate sentencing, putting into place a 
sentencing system based on principles of just desert and accountability."); Michele Cotton, 
Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an  Articulated Purpose of Criminal 
Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313,1358 (2000) ("California endorsed retribution as 'the' 
purpose for its punishment in 1977 and Pennsylvania identified it as the 'primary' purpose 
in 1982 ...." (footnote omitted)); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of 
Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821,874 (1988) 
("Minnesota's sentencing guidelines for adult offenders . . . [are] expressly designed to achieve 
'just deserts' ...."); cf. Michael Tonry, U.S. Sentencing Systems Fragmenting, in PENAL 
REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 21,28 tbl. 1.1 (Michael H. Tonry ed., 2001) (showing that 
desert is a highly expressed value in comprehensive structured sentencing jurisdictions such 
as Minnesota and Washington). 
2. According to the Model Penal Code, 
The general purposes of the provisions governing sentencing and corrections, 
to be discharged by the many official actors within the sentencing and 
corrections system, are: 
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing and correction of individual 
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But these reforms, and the current debates, are unclear as to 
whether the conception of desert under consideration is a 
deontological or an empirical one.3 The two can be quite different. 
A deontological conception of desert, based on reasoning from 
principles of right and good and aimed toward giving us a transcen- 
dent notion of justice,' would distribute criminal liability and 
punishment differently than would an empirical conception of 
desert, based upon empirical research into the shared intuitions 
of justice of the community that is to be governed by the code or 
practice being formulated. For example, moral philosophers 
disagree about the significance of resulting harm, and each side of 
the debate has plausible arguments to make.5 In contrast, all 
- - - -- - 
offenders: 
(i) to render punishment within a range of severity proportionate to the 
gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the 
blameworthiness of offenders; 
(ii) when possible with realistic prospect of success, to serve goals of 
offender rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous 
offenders, and restoration of crime victims and communities, provided that 
these goals are pursued within the boundaries of sentence severity 
permitted in subsection (a)(i); and 
(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve the 
applicable purposes from subsections (a)(i) and (ii) .... 
MODEL PENAL CODE 5 1.02(2) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL 
CODE]. 
3. Although deontological desert traditionally has carried the desert banner in academic 
circles, today's law- and policymakers often give people's-sense-of-justice explanations for 
desert-based legislation. In other words, legislators make empirical claims, not philosophical 
arguments. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 2, 5 1.02(2) cmt. c (suggesting that 
because desert can be difficult to quantify a t  times, sentencing commissions should solicit a 
diverse range of community perspectives, and that doing so gives the commissions a "unique 
credibility"). 
4. But, as  the reader will see in the text following note 19, only some moral 
philosophers-moral realists--conceive of desert as having such transcendent nature. 
5. Those that have argued that resulting harm should matter include Leo Katz, Why the 
Successful Assassin Is More Wicked than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CAL. L. REV. 791, 806 
(2000) (arguing by hypothetical that principled moral analysis suggests harm should be 
considered when assessing blameworthiness); Ken Levy, The Solution to the Problem of 
Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just As Punishable As the Wrongful Action that Causes It, 24 
LAW & PHIL. 263,303 (2005); and Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of 
Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGALISSUES 237,267-71 (1994) (positing that because we resent 
successful wrongdoers more than we do those who unsuccessfully attempt harm, we feel 
more guilty about our own completed misdeeds than we do about attempts, and we are 
dissatisfied with reasonable moral choices that produce undesirable consequences, which 
suggests that "results matter" in the moral arena). Those that have argued that resulting 
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available data suggest a nearly universal and deeply held view 
among the community that resulting harm does matter, tha t  it 
increases a n  offender's deserved p ~ n i s h m e n t . ~  This practical 
difference is only one of a host of issues on which a moral philoso- 
pher's conclusion might vary from the empirical data on lay 
persons' shared intuitions of justice.' 
Should we prefer one conception of desert over the other for use 
as  a distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment? 
Each of the two competing conceptions of desert offer distinct 
advantages and disadvantages. 
-- 
harm should not matter include Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 6 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 8 (1994); Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some &rd 
but Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 119 (1995); Sanford H. Kadish, 
Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 
680 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 879, 881-82 (2000); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Respomibility, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 409; Richard Parker, Blame, Punishment, and the Role of Result, 
21 AM. PHIL. Q. 269, 273 (1984) (advocating that resulting harm should not be relevant to 
punishment determinations, as "[fjortune may make us healthy, wealthy, or wise, but it 
ought not determine whether we go to prison"); and Stephen J .  Schulhofer, Harm and 
Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1497, 1600-03 (1974). 
6. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: 
COMMUNITYVIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 14-28,181-97 (1996) (reporting empirical studies); 
John H. Mansfield, Hart and Honort!, Causation in the Law--A Comment, 17 VAND. L. REV. 
487, 494-96 (1964) (concluding that "[tlhe notion that there should be a difference in 
punishment [between unsuccessful attempts and completed crimes] is deeply rooted in 
popular conscience, and to ignore it is to risk bury] nullification"). 
7. See generally ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 6 (comparing community views on a 
wide variety of criminal law issues to existing legal rules and discussing the points of 
disagreement). Finding wide and persistent disagreement among moral philosophers on 
many if not most significant issues is common. See supra note 5. Indeed, it is likely that on 
any issue over which law- or policymakers themselves disagree-prompting them to look to 
other disciplines for guidance-philosophers almost certainly will disagree among 
themselves. Other disciplines may have disagreements, but because most have some 
objective test by which a writer ultimately may be proven right or wrong, over time some 
coalescence tends to emerge around an accepted view. A proposed theory ends up either 
explaining more of the available data, and is accepted; or does not, and is rejected. But 
without such a clear test mechanism, moral philosophy lacks a path to coalescence. Because 
philosophers will disagree on nearly any s i g h c a n t  issue, an outsider often has difficulty 
gaining something useful, in part because, to make an informed judgment as to which view 
ought to be given deference, the outsider must herself know something about moral 
philosophy. In other words, the outsider must become a bit of an insider. Ultimately, the 
moral philosophy literature is not terribly accessible, and thus its informed use is commonly 
costly. 
Deontological desert can offer a unique and critically important 
value to the criminal justice law- or policymaker: it can provide a 
foundation for desert that transcends any particular case, commu- 
nity, or culture. That is, it can give us a means by which we can tell 
the truth of what is deserved, insulated from the vicissitudes of 
human irrationality and emotions. This deontological conception of 
desert gives us the ability to determine when our shared intuitions 
of justice may be wrong. Even though a liability or punishment rule 
may be popular, it nonetheless may be unfair or unjust, and the 
deontological conception of desert lets us spot these justice errors 
in people's intuitions. 
The standard complaint against relying upon such a deontological 
conception of desert in distributing criminal liability and punish- 
ment is that it leads to disutility? Those consequentialists who seek 
to minimize future crime, for example, will be quick to point out 
that deontological desert as  a distributive principle will allow future 
crimes to occur that could have been avoided under a utilitarian 
distributive p r in~ ip le .~  Traditionally, that fact has meant a 
utilitarian preference for distributing liability to optimize deter- 
rence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, or some combination of them.'' 
Reliance upon an empirical conception of desert in the distribu- 
tion of criminal liability and punishment prompts its own set of 
complaints. One primary objection is that people's intuitions of 
justice are too vague and suffer too much disagreement to be 
effectively operationalized. But empirical studies show this common 
wisdom to be false. In fact, people's shared intuitions of justice are 
quite nuanced: small changes in facts produce large and predictable 
- - - - -- 
8. See Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms of 
the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 450-52 (2004) (describing 
deontological theories of punishment); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 229, 233 (1998) (contrasting consequentialist and deontological theories). 
9. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 6, at 5-7. 
10. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (1962) (listing the general purposes of the 
provisions). 
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changes in the assessment of blameworthiness." Further, an 
astounding level of agreement exists across cultures and demo- 
graphics on the relative degree of blameworthiness. Although 
people and cultures disagree about the general level of punishment 
severity a criminal justice system should adopt, once the endpoint 
of a society's punishment continuum is set, there is significant 
agreement on the ordinal ranking of cases along that continuum, at 
least for the core wrongs of physical aggression, unconsented-to 
takings, and deception or dishonesty in exchanges.12 Thus, empiri- 
cal desert does not produce an indeterminate range of punishment, 
as some have suggested,13 but rather a specific amount. It is not 
that a particular violation necessarily deserves a specific amount of 
punishment in some absolute sense; rather, each violation, once 
placed on a fixed continuum of punishment, deserves a particular 
amount of punishment because that amount is required to give that 
violation its proper ordinal ranking among the range of possible 
violations. One can easily imagine how the erroneous common 
wisdom about disagreement developed: disagreement over general 
punishment severity-the continuum endpoint-masked the 
agreement on the ordinal ranking of violations. 
As noted, the broad consensus on ordinal ranking exists primar- 
ily for the core wrongs: injury to others, the taking of property, and 
deceit or dishonesty in dealings.'* As the harm or wrong moves 
away from this core, disagreements appear across cultures and 
demographics, depending primarily upon the perceived strength of 
the analogy between the new conduct and the core wrongs. 
Ultimately, operationalizing empirical desert is quite feasible, more 
so than deontological desert, because of the higher level of agree- 
ment on the former than the latter. 
Consequentialists might offer a second kind of objection to 
empirical desert as a distributive principle, similar to the disutility 
complaint they make against deontological desert: such a desert 
distribution of criminal liability and punishment allows future 
- 
11. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Intuitions of Justice pt. I (Mar. 19, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
12. Id. pt. 11. 
13. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 74 (1974). 
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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crime that could be avoided with a distribution that optimizes 
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, or other traditional 
utilitarian crime control mechanisms.15 But, as  I have suggested 
elsewhere, strong arguments suggest greater utility in a distribu- 
tion based on shared intuitions of justice than in a distribution 
based upon optimizing deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacita- 
tion. l6 
To briefly summarize those "utility of desert" arguments:" 
deviating from a community's intuitions of justice inspires resis- 
tance and subversion among participants-juries, judges, prosecu- 
tors, and offenders-when effective criminal justice depends upon 
acquiescence and cooperation. l8 Relatedly , some of the system's 
power to control conduct derives from its potential to stigmatize 
violators-with some persons this is a more powerful, yet essen- 
tially cost-free, control mechanism compared to imprisonment.lg Yet 
the system's ability to stigmatize depends upon it having moral 
credibility with the community; for a violation to trigger stigmatiza- 
tion, the law must have earned a reputation for accurately assess- 
ing what violations do and do not deserve moral c~ndemna t ion .~~  
Liability and punishment rules that deviate from a community's 
shared intuitions of justice undercut this reputation." 
Perhaps the greatest utility of desert comes through a more 
subtle but potentially more influential form. 
The real power to gain compliance with society's rules of 
prescribed conduct lies not in the threat of official criminal 
sanction, but in the [influence] of the intertwined forces of social 
and individual moral control. The networks of interpersonal 
relationships in which people find themselves, the social norms 
and prohibitions shared among those relationships and trans- 
mitted through those social networks, and the internalized 
15. See Gruber, supra note 8, at 454-68 (discussing consequentialist theories of 
punishment, including deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation). 
16. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 
456 (1997). 
17. Id. 
18. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 6, at 202. 
19. Id. at 201. 
20. Id. at 201-02. 
21. Id. at 202. 
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representations of those norms and moral precepts [control 
people's conduct]. 
... The law is not irrelevant to these social and personal 
forces. Criminal law, in particular, plays a central role in 
creating and maintaining the social consensus necessary for 
sustaining moral norms. In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, 
the criminal law may be the only society-wide mechanism that 
transcends cultural and ethnic differences. Thus, the criminal 
law's most important real-world effect may be its ability to assist 
in the building, shaping, and maintaining of these norms and 
moral principles. It can contribute to and harness the 
compliance-producing power of interpersonal relationships and 
personal morality. 
The criminal law [also] can have ... effect in gaining compli- 
ance with its commands [through another mechanism]. If it 
earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the commu- 
nity ... perceive[s] as condemnable, people are more likely to 
defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as appropri- 
ate to follow in those borderline cases in which the propriety of 
certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the 
actor. The importance of this role should not be underestimated; 
in a society with the complex interdependencies characteristic 
of ours, an apparently harmless action can have destructive 
consequences. When the action is criminalized by the legal 
system, one would want the citizen to "respect the law" in such 
an instance even though he or she does not immediately intuit 
why that action is banned. Such deference will be facilitated if 
citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate guide 
to appropriate prudential and moral behavior. 
The extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in [all] these 
respects-in [avoiding resistance and subversion of an unjust 
system, in bringing the power of stigmatization to bear,] in 
facilitating[,] communicating[, and maintaining] societal 
consensus on what is and is not condemnable, and in gaining 
compliance in borderline cases through deference to its moral 
authority ... is to a great extent dependent on the degree of 
moral credibility that the criminal law has [gained] in the minds 
of the citizens governed by it. Thus, ... the criminal law's moral 
credibility is essential to effective crime control, and is enhanced 
if the distribution of criminal liability is perceived as "doing 
justice," that is, if it assigns liability and punishment in ways 
that the community perceives as consistent with [their shared 
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intuitions of justice]. Conversely, the system's moral credibility, 
and therefore its crime control effectiveness, is undermined by 
a distribution of liability that deviates from community percep- 
tions of just desert.22 
The important point here is that distribution according to the 
moral philosophy conception of desert is not only unnecessary for 
these utilitarian crime control benefits, but indeed ineffective in 
gaining them. The beneficial consequences of a desert distribution, 
described above, flow not from following a deontological desert 
distribution, but only from following an empirical desert distribu- 
tion--one that tracks the community's shared intuitions of justice. 
It is the community'sperception that justice is being done that pays 
dividends, not the system's actual success as measured by a 
deontological conception of desert.z3 
On the other hand, empirical desert can be criticized on the 
ground that it is not a reliable source for determining what is truly 
deserved, as deontological desert can claim. In other words, 
generally tracking a community's shared intuitions of justice may 
well build some credibility within that population that the criminal 
justice system is doing justice, but it does not follow that in fact 
justice is being done. Shared intuitions might simply be wrong; they 
tell us only what lay persons believe is just. Only deontological 
desert can reliably tell us what is 
111. THE ROLE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHERS IN THE COMPETITION 
BETWEEN DEONTOLOGICAL ND EMPIRICAL DESERT 
What role do moral philosophers play in this competition between 
deontological and empirical desert? We nonphilosophers might well 
assume that they stand on the side of deontological desert, reason- 
ing out justice from principles of right and good, facing on the other 
side the social psychology researchers mapping people's shared 
intuitions of justice to determine empirical desert. In fact, the 
situation is somewhat more complex than this, in ways that reflect 
22. Id. at 587-88. 
23. See id. at 7. 
24. Id. at 6. 
20071 THE ROLE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHERS 1839 
both well and badly on the usefulness of the current moral philoso- 
phy project. 
First, consider the special usefulness moral philosophy provides. 
Unfortunately, social psychologists are rather unsophisticated 
about what drives people's intuitions of justice. Most of the studies 
that they have done without the involvement of moral philosophers 
or criminal law theorists are nearly useless, because the investi- 
gators are testing concepts that muddle together what moral 
philosophers know to be distinct and importantly different issues. 
The moral philosophy literature is the richest and most sophisti- 
cated source about lay intuitions of justice that exists today, and it 
is the starting point that I recommend to any social psychologist 
doing research in the area. 
The reason for this superiority is clear: the current methodology 
of moral philosophers relies heavily upon intuitions of justice, both 
informally and formally, as  in Rawls's "reflective eq~i l ib r ium."~~ A 
standard analytic form, if not the standard form, among moral 
philosophers today is to use hypotheticals and philosophers' own 
intuitions about the proper resolution of the hypothetical a s  a basis 
for building moral  principle^.^^ Their judgments about the intu- 
itively proper resolution of each of a series of hypotheticals are 
used as data points, a s  it were, from which philosophers derive a 
moral principle, which can then be tested and refined by comparing 
the moral principle results to philosophers' intuitions on other 
 hypothetical^.^^ The ultimate effect of this standard methodology is 
that philosophers have thought more carefully about intuitions of 
25. See JOHNRAW, ATHEORY OF JuSTIcE42-43 (rev. ed. 1999) (explaining that the best 
sense of justice is one that matches a person's judgments in reflective equilibrium-a state 
reached after consideration of various conceptions of justice). 
26. See generally Kadish, supra note 5 (employing numerous hypotheticals in an attempt 
to prove the harm doctrine unsupportable); Katz, supra note 5 (employing hypotheticals to 
counter Kadish's view of the harm doctrine); Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts About 
Argument by Hypothetical, 88 CAL. L. REV. 813 (2000) (critically analyzing Professor Katz's 
use of the "argument-by-hypothetical" method). 
27. See also Leo Katz, Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 
146 U .  PA. L. REV. 1465, 1480, 1482-84 (1998) (providing an example of moral philosophers 
using intuitive analysis of case hypotheticals as  a standard method by using a hypothetical, 
derived from the application of the necessity defense to situations where the actor has 
culpably created the justifying situation, to argue that a t  times persons can be blamed for 
making the wrong decision in a state "of unavoidable moral ignorance"). 
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justice than any other group, and their literature reflects this 
sophistication. 
But this methodology is problematic, for several reasons. First, 
presumably philosophers want to rely upon intuitions that accu- 
rately capture the shared intuitions of the community, not some 
idiosyncratic intuition that only philosophers share. The danger 
here is not only that philosophers as a group may be different 
from the rest of the community-some nonphilosophers would think 
this an obvious truth-but also that, even if philosophers are not 
idiosyncratic, their methods of testing their own intuitions violate 
many rules of reliable empirical testing. Presumably, in no 
situation would moral philosophers be happy to use inaccurate 
representations of intuitions of justice. But, as I have described 
elsewhere,28 the methods by which moral philosophers think they 
are learning intuitions of justice are simply bad research tech- 
niques, giving good reason to believe that they produce unreliable 
results in assessing intuitions of justice.29 If philosophers think 
intuitions of justice are useful to their enterprise, they ought to at  
least get them right. They ought to look to a more reliable source, 
or adopt more reliable methods of social psychology research, and 
not "wing it" on their own. 
A second, more problematic feature of moral philosophy's heavy 
reliance upon intuitions of justice is that it compromises philoso- 
phy's ability to reliably spot community intuitions of justice that are 
wrong, in the sense of conflicting with a notion of justice that 
transcends shared  intuition^.^' The methodological reliance of moral 
philosophy on intuitions of justice creates a bias in favor of moral 
principles consistent with intuitions. Thus, moral principles with 
principled, reasoned support might nonetheless fail to gain currency 
among philosophers, or might be discarded, simply because 
philosophers as a group think their results inconsistent with 
intuitions-a practical veto by philosophers' shared intuitions. 
28. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 823 ("[In some cases, t]he results we get ... are 
probably not intuitive judgments of blameworthiness but more likely intellectualized 
answers generated by applying the professor's resident collection of theoretical 
positions-[for example,] whether resulting harm ought to be judged significant."). 
29. Id. at 825. 
30. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 6, at 5-7. 
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But providing this transcendent check on intuitions is how 
philosophers are most useful to law- and policymakers. It is for this 
check-to assure that a shared intuition of justice does not violate 
a transcendent principle of justice-that philosophy is given 
deference. Yet moral philosophers, by their heavy reliance upon 
intuitions of justice, have become unreliable in performing just this 
task. 
Many nonphilosophers may be shocked to hear that many, if not 
most, of today's moral philosophers no longer see themselves as 
being in the business of trying to provide this transcendent check. 
The moral relativists have given up the enterprise entirely; only the 
moral realists continue to see it as an explicit and attainable goal. 
Everyone in between sees themselves as providing some kind of 
useful guidance to law- and policymakers, but guidance of a sort 
that is different from the transcendent check on people's intuitions 
of justice that law- and policymakers need. 
The useful guidance they think they provide is, in a sense, to 
"rationalize" intuitions, as, for example, in translating a set of 
shared intuitions of justice on a set of cases into a general principle. 
But social psychologists do that when they interpret data from lay 
intuition studies to construct a principle that seems to explain how 
subjects are thinking about the test cases. Philosophers might 
argue that they also examine and resolve conflicts between 
competing intuitions, in part by taking account of the relative depth 
of our commitment to the intuitions in conflict. But, of course, that 
too is just an empirical question-to which intuition do people have 
greater allegiance when two conflict?-that social psychologists can 
more reliably investigate. 
But one can imagine that moral philosophers might respond that 
they are doing something more here than just resolving conflicts 
between intuitions by testing the relative depth of commitment- 
the relative strength-of the conflicting intuitions. They might 
claim that their analysis here goes beyond the empirical to bring to 
bear some more fundamental, transcendent analysis, relying upon 
objective principles of right and good. And if they did this, they 
would have something useful to say to law- and policymakers. They 
would be providing that needed transcendent check on people's 
intuitions of justice. Unfortunately, most of today's moral philoso- 
phers do not do this, and do not claim to do this. Perhaps they do 
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not because they think it impossible to do, which is fine, but then 
they ought to accept their limited usefulness to law- and 
policymakers, which many of them may do. 
A defense of the intuition-dependent methodology that many 
moral philosophers appear to make is found in a claim that 
intuitions of justice provide some validating effect in assessing true 
moral principles of justice:31 that many people share an intuition 
means that a moral principle consistent with that intuition is 
thereby made stronger. Social psychologists would find this an odd 
claim, for one has good reason to believe that a person's intuitions 
of justice are simply behavioral phenomena. It is well documented 
that people hold strong intuitions of justice even though the reasons 
for their holding those intuitions are inaccessible to them.32 When 
asked to explain an intuition, many people will have nothing to 
offer, other than perhaps "It's obvious." Others, perhaps those who 
prize their self-image as a rational being, will offer an explanation, 
yet different people offer different explanations even though their 
intuitions are identical. 
In other words, the research suggests that the source of intu- 
itions of justice is not rational reasoning but rather the effects of 
evolutionary and social forces.33 And such a source of intuitions 
provides no reason to think that intuitions have any claim to 
validate a moral principle in any transcendent philosophical sense. 
What gave evolutionary advantage six million years ago on the 
savanna hardly justifies enshrining as a moral truth today. 
Monkeys and other primates have intuitions of a similar phenom- 
enological sort, even intuitions about fairness.34 Are we to assume 
- 
31. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 25, a t  42-43; JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF 
RIGHTS 20 (1990) ('We certainly act as if we thought of many of our moral beliefs as 
necessary truths."). 
32. See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social 
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (describing a 
situation ix which subjects were asked for a reason to believe incest is wrong, and generally 
could not supply one, but simply asserted that the act is wrong even if they could not explain 
why); Jonathan Haidt & Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of 
Conservatives and Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 217-18 (2001); Debra 
Lieberman et al., Does Morality Have a Biological Basis? An Empirical Test of the Factors 
Governing Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest, 270PROC. ROYALSOC'Y LONDON 819,825-26 
(2003). 
33. See supra note 32. 
34. See, e.g., FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES 38-39 
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that  monkey "intuitions" about fairness contribute to the validation 
of moral principles for monkeys? 
Do I think tha t  moral philosophers should cease their reliance 
upon intuitions of justice as they construct what they offer as the 
deontological conception of desert? Not entirely, for I see great 
benefit from their work in the research to map shared intuitions of 
justice. But my guess is tha t  moral philosophers themselves would 
want to contribute something more than what social psychologists 
already can do. If they are to provide a philosophical conception of 
desert that  transcends our intuitions of justice, they must adopt a 
methodology that  is more skeptical of reliance upon those intu- 
itions. 
(rev. ed. 1998) (reporting evidence that some nonhuman primates have capacities to think 
purposefully). In a recent experiment, brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) refused to 
participate in an exchange if they observed another monkey receiving a better deal than they 
received. Some researchers suggest that this refusal implies not only understanding of 
exchange and unfairness, but a willingness to endue  a cost in what can be interpreted as 
a kind of protest. Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 
NATURE 297, 297-98 (2003). Indeed, Brosnan and de Waal mention cases of monkeys 
"[t]hrowing the token a t  the experimenter." Id. a t  299. Similarly, some evidence from the 
field indicates that rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) are subject to harassment if they do 
not let others know when they have found food, an intriguing potential example of moralistic 
punishment. Marc D. Hauser & Peter Marler, Food-Associated Calls in Rhesus Macaques 
(Macaca mulatta): II. Costs and Benefits of Call Production and Suppression, 4 BEHAV. 
ECOLOGY 206, 211-12 (1993). 
